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Authored by: Gringo_ on Friday, March 15 2013 @ 11:30 PM EDT |
Unfortunately I was only able to skim it, with little
comprehension, unable
at this time to give it deep
contemplation. Seems though you have given us food
for
thought here that wasn't anticipated by PoIR. I have not
seen reference to
the semantic level outside of PoIR's
discussions. At a minimum it appears PoIR
hasn't done his
homework, or he would have incorporated this material into
his
essays to point out it's fallacies.
What have you done to us, macliam? I fear
that without a
powerful rebuttal, what you have just presented leaves his
entire thesis at risk of being summarily dismissed by anyone
who matters ie:
The USPTO. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: PolR on Saturday, March 16 2013 @ 03:13 AM EDT |
Thanks for your thoughts. I will have to read them again to make sure I
understand everything.
Did you check how the analysis based on semiotics related to you are saying?
What do you think about this?
My view is this whole legal analysis is blurred because the courts are
conflating a mathematical description of a physical invention with a statement
of the computation which must be accomplished. This is the reversal of
semantical relationships which are described in section B.4.
A first step should be to straighten up this confusion. No meaningful discussion
of claim construction can occur before this happens. Then we can draw the line
between the two types of meaning: interpretants and referents. Only then we can
tell an abstract idea from the application of an idea.
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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