|
Authored by: PolR on Tuesday, July 24 2012 @ 01:16 PM EDT |
If
declaring that software is a "machine" for purposes of
patent
law is the only way to uphold software patents, they
are likely to do so.
Is this the case? Software is patentable as a process. This point
seems moot unless there is an argument that there is no way to patent software
except as a machine. Where is this argument? It is not in the
article.
MACHINE: " a mechanically, electrically, or
electronically
operated device for performing a task"
You have to concede
that "CPU + program" meets the above
definition of a machine.
No
I don't have to concede that. This is the very thing the article disputes. I
prefer to say "computer+program" because CPU can't store and execute programs by
themselves. Part of the argument amounts to say "computer+program" is not a
machine different from the computer standing alone.
First, if
"computer+program" is a different machine we could say the exact same thing
about "computer+data". Does storing data on a computer make a new machine?
Programs are another form of data. So if "computer+program" meet this definition
so do "computer+data". Is this a desirable result? Please note that data is
changed billions of times per second in a computer.
Second you need to take
into account the moving parts. Programs can change during execution, exactly
like data. For example there is the case of LISP interpreters which generate and
execute code on the fly. Or I may use a lambda-reduction machine where the same
universal algorithm is used for all the tasks and the "programs" are input data
that will be constantly be rewritten over and over again as the execution
progresses. You are assuming that there is in this physical universe an entity
referred to as "computer+program" which carries the intended task recited in the
claim. Programmers can arrange matters so that the program part is either broken
in small transient pieces or is constantly changing.
Also there is the
aspect of semantics. The meanings of he bits is part of what makes software what
it is. But semantics is not a physical component of the machine. Semantics is
not a mechanical, electrical or electronic operation, so this element of your
definition is not met.
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
|
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, July 24 2012 @ 01:23 PM EDT |
Can the court lie?
Are judges allowed, within the law, to state that something factual is not
true?
You say that judges are "used to legal fiction" but what other legal
fictions are you talking about? Are these legal fictions which are concern
things that are abstractions or intangibles? Are there any legal fictions which
concern any tangibles?
Well done, btw. I appreciate reading what you've been saying though it runs
contrary to my line of thinking. Without an advocate for the opposition it is
difficult to see what they are thinking.
j
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
|
|
|
|