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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 10:22 AM EDT |
n/t [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 07:40 PM EDT |
What I read in US v. Gonzalez was that the court improperly
did not allow a
challenge for cause. (214 F.3d 1109, 1113)
On appeal, Gonzalez
argues that the district court was
obligated to excuse Camacho for cause under
either an
implied or express bias theory. In response, the government
contends
that neither implied nor express bias existed. It
argues that Camacho should
simply be considered as one of
the many people who know someone who has used or
sold drugs,
and not someone who is subject to challenge for cause. We
disagree.
In this case, Camacho disclosed the fact that her ex-
husband,
the father of her daughter, dealt and used cocaine
— the same drug and conduct
at issue here. Moreover, she
described her former husband's drug dealing as one
of the
reasons for her relatively recent divorce and the break-up
of her
family. She admitted that the experience was painful.
Asked three times whether
she could put that experience
aside and serve fairly and impartially, she never
affirmatively stated that she could. Instead, she
equivocated each
time.
To me, that indicates that the defense attempted to
challenge for cause, and the court declined the challenge.
Of course, we won't
know the exact facts of the voir dire in
this case, or what Hogan said during
it until the
transcripts are released, but it would seem erroneous if he
stated during the voir dire that he held patent(s), and
Samsung attempted to
challenge for cause based on that - he
should have been excused.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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