then I defy you to come up with *anything* that a
computer, or
even a human
mind, could do that would not qualify as a physical
effect.
Your definition places the entire universe of patentable matter at
naught, since
abstract and physical are merged into the same unseparated whole;
the
unpatentable "abstract" must perforce include every physical
thing.
I'm sorry, but you don't know what the universe of
patentable matter is.
It is defined as "any new or useful process,
machine, manufacture,
or composition thereof, or any new or useful improvement
thereof ..."
That's quoting straight from the statute, 35 USC 101. Look it up
yourself.
And even to the extent that you might have been correct about
a
physical transformation being required, I submit that transmitting data over
a network and displaying it on a computer is a physical
transformation
other than a mere mental state or an abstract
concept.
But more
importantly, requiring a physical transformation isn't the
law anymore.
No less an authority than the Supreme Court has said so
-- recently -- and the
Supreme Court decision is the controlling law. The
exceptions to the four
statutory categories are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”
Bilski at page 5. Of course, the posting of Internet domains using a
server is a mere physical phenomenon best observed in the morning sky
between
just before sunrise, and it is based on the abstract equation
E=mc^3, for
sufficiently small values of 3.
Or see page 8 of Bilski:
This
Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a
useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for
determining whether some
claimed inventions are processes under §101.
The machine-or- transformation
test is not the sole test for deciding
whether an invention is a
patent-eligible “process.”
Mayo v.
Prometheus Laboraties doesn't really make things clearer, so
if you were
able to relate the law in Prometheus to the claims in the patent
at issue here,
you might be able to make an interesting argument:
The question
before us is whether the claims [at issue in
Mayo v. Prometheus] do
significantly more than simply describe these
natural relations. To put the
matter more precisely, do the patent claims
add enough to their statements of
the correlations to allow the processes
they describe to qualify as
patent-eligible processes that [merely] apply
natural laws? We believe that the
answer to this question is no."
Of course, to use this
argument, you will probably have to show that
assigning a domain name,
operating a server, and delaying publication of
the assignment qualify as
"applying natural laws." I doubt your arguments
will be convincing because
they haven't been so far, but maybe someone
else's might
be.
And you aren't in any position to come barging into PJ's
place and demand
she
answer to you. That's a bit rude.
You
shouldn't speak for PJ. She's perfectly willing and able to take
care of
herself and to engage in a spirited conversation, and I respect her
for that.
If she doesn't want this
conversation to go on, she'll delete
it.
A thoughtful, well-reasoned response to a posting will not
only provide insight for your readers, but will also increase their respect for
your knowledge and abilities. -- Linux Advocacy mini-HOWTO
by
Paul L. Rogers, v0.4, 6 February 1997.
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