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Authored by: Gringo_ on Sunday, March 17 2013 @ 10:10 AM EDT |
That was very readable and illuminating. I found the
Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp case very interesting.
"The issue in Deepsouth was whether
petitioner infringed
by selling the unassembled parts of machines embodying
patented combinations to foreign buyers who assembled and
used them
abroad." He was not found to infringe.
Kinda makes me think about
patented software. Sitting on
a disk on a shelf it does nothing. It doesn't
implement its
patented invention until it is run on a computer. So perhaps
if
I make software that embodies the same invention, there
is no infringement if
it is not run on a computer in a
jurisdiction where the patent rules, even if I
made that
software in the same jurisdiction where the patent was
obtained.
Beyond that, perhaps even if it is run on
computers within the jurisdiction
where the patent was
obtained, perhaps I am still not liable for patent
infringement if I don't run it on my computer? Only
the person running
the software may be liable? [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: PolR on Sunday, March 17 2013 @ 10:48 AM EDT |
The biggest constraint to section 101 analysis is the need to consider the claim
as a whole without looking at which elements are new and nonobvious. This is a
consequence of this three doors doctrine.
This aspect of the doctrine has been weakened by Mayo. The Supreme Court has
accepted that there could be overlap between section 101 and 102 analysis
because we need to know what are the conventional elements of the claim to make
the kind of analysis required by Mayo.
There is a notable exception which is the printed matter doctrine. The printed
matter has nopatentable weight. It cannot distinguish over the prior art under
most circumstances. There are exceptions to this exception. Collins's article
quoted in the response explains the details.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, March 17 2013 @ 06:21 PM EDT |
Anatomy of the CAFC
> we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious,
> though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions
> which are conceptually unrelated
> The transition made in 1952 was with respect to the old term
> “invention,” imputing patentability, which term was replaced
> by a new statutory provision, § 103, requiring nonobviousness,
Thus Congress being confused heaps confusion on the Courts
and us. With procedural requirements to satisfy it's easy to
overlook the eligibility of subject matter.
The Dictionary Wars
I prefer to follow Alice [Through the Looking Glass, not
C.L.S. v.] and hold that an invention is, a priori, novel
and non-obvious. In the 1952 Act Congress was not only
bold and exemplary in expanding that tautology, they also
exposed a Hydra. Three doors now where one had sufficed.
Alice's prime specification was that an invention must be useful.
The PAEs know this too. I'm not aware of any suits for infringement
of patents on Laser Light Cat Exercisers or Double Comb Overs.
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