decoration decoration
Stories

GROKLAW
When you want to know more...
decoration
For layout only
Home
Archives
Site Map
Search
About Groklaw
Awards
Legal Research
Timelines
ApplevSamsung
ApplevSamsung p.2
ArchiveExplorer
Autozone
Bilski
Cases
Cast: Lawyers
Comes v. MS
Contracts/Documents
Courts
DRM
Gordon v MS
GPL
Grokdoc
HTML How To
IPI v RH
IV v. Google
Legal Docs
Lodsys
MS Litigations
MSvB&N
News Picks
Novell v. MS
Novell-MS Deal
ODF/OOXML
OOXML Appeals
OraclevGoogle
Patents
ProjectMonterey
Psystar
Quote Database
Red Hat v SCO
Salus Book
SCEA v Hotz
SCO Appeals
SCO Bankruptcy
SCO Financials
SCO Overview
SCO v IBM
SCO v Novell
SCO:Soup2Nuts
SCOsource
Sean Daly
Software Patents
Switch to Linux
Transcripts
Unix Books

Gear

Groklaw Gear

Click here to send an email to the editor of this weblog.


You won't find me on Facebook


Donate

Donate Paypal


No Legal Advice

The information on Groklaw is not intended to constitute legal advice. While Mark is a lawyer and he has asked other lawyers and law students to contribute articles, all of these articles are offered to help educate, not to provide specific legal advice. They are not your lawyers.

Here's Groklaw's comments policy.


What's New

STORIES
No new stories

COMMENTS last 48 hrs
No new comments


Sponsors

Hosting:
hosted by ibiblio

On servers donated to ibiblio by AMD.

Webmaster
In a First, Seattle Judge Sets RAND Rate in MS v. Motorola ~pj | 352 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
In a First, Seattle Judge Sets RAND Rate in MS v. Motorola ~pj
Authored by: Anonymous on Friday, April 26 2013 @ 03:43 PM EDT
No, I am saying that Motorola's H.264 patent is certainly one of the least
valuable patents that are potentially essential to H.264 and that their rate is
absurdly unRAND at a 4000x rate.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

In a First, Seattle Judge Sets RAND Rate in MS v. Motorola ~pj
Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, April 28 2013 @ 03:57 AM EDT
I would also suggest that the situation where one patent in a standard
represents 99.5% of the value of the standard would never happen. If 99.5% of
the value of a standard is in a single patent then the owner of that patent will
simply commercialise the technology. A standard works where many parties need to
cooperate in order to achieve a viable technology. Any single patent owner can
choose to participate or not. If they decide to not participate, then the
standards group can simply develop an alternate approach to the same technical
requirement, and the original patent owner will be left aside, and perhaps never
be able to create any value from the invention.

Standards are about promoting trade (as in the rising tide raises all ships),
and patents are about promoting sales of a single company. A group of companies
coming together to create a single market is a cartel, and the way standards get
around this requirement is to agree the RAND contract. A patent will simply not
be included in a standard unless the owner has made a RAND commitment. Having
made the commitment, going alone or joining a pool is simply about commercial
efficiency. In a pool, every potential licensor knows who to approach, and can
be confident that development of the technology can proceed unencumbered.
Without a pool, a potential licensor will need to approach many patent owners
and make individual agreements, wasting time and money for everybody.

The RAND commitment is a contract matter, and so the courts/arbitration/mutual
agreement is the appropriate approach.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

Groklaw © Copyright 2003-2013 Pamela Jones.
All trademarks and copyrights on this page are owned by their respective owners.
Comments are owned by the individual posters.

PJ's articles are licensed under a Creative Commons License. ( Details )