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Authored by: SpaceLifeForm on Friday, May 24 2013 @ 09:40 PM EDT |
Link
"I don't know what you mean by
'glory,' " Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of
course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument
for you!' "
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down
argument'," Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in
rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is
to be master—that's all."
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so
after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of
them—particularly verbs, they're the proudest—adjectives you can do anything
with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That's
what I say!"
This passage was used in Britain by Lord Atkin in
his dissenting judgement in the seminal case Liversidge v. Anderson (1942),
where he protested about the distortion of a statute by the majority of the
House of Lords. It also became a popular citation in United States legal
opinions, appearing in 250 judicial decisions in the Westlaw database as of
April 19, 2008, including two Supreme Court cases (TVA v. Hill and Zschernig v.
Miller).
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You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Friday, May 24 2013 @ 11:49 PM EDT |
Hate to be the pedant, but anyhow...
(d) EXHAUSTION OF
RIGHTS.—Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), the sale or other disposition of a
useful end result by a person entitled to assert a defense under this section in
connection with a patent with respect to that useful end result shall exhaust
the patent owner’s rights under the patent to the extent that such rights would
have been exhausted had such sale or other disposition been made by the patent
owner.
This begs the question: to what extent would such rights have been
exhausted had the sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner? To
the best of my knowledge, the statute (Title 35 of the U.S.C.) is silent on the
matter.
"This begs the question" does not mean what you think it
does.
"begging the question" is when the answer provided starts with itself
as a premise.
"begging for" or "raising" or "calling for" a question is when
an answer prompts the hearer to ask another question.
If you use the phrase
"begs the question" and then enumerate what question you refer to, you are not
understanding the proper usage of the phrase. "begs the question" is a
description of a logical fallacy, not a description of an action that is done to
a question.
Yes, I realise that people will keep using that term
incorrectly. No, I do not think that that means I should give up the precision
and clarity afforded by proper use. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Ian Al on Saturday, May 25 2013 @ 04:43 AM EDT |
From Bilski (full citations omitted):The argument that business
methods are categorically outside of §101’s scope is further undermined by the
fact that federal law explicitly contemplates the existence of at least some
business method patents. Under 35 U. S. C. §273(b)(1), if a patent-holder claims
infringement based on “a method in [a] patent,” the alleged infringer can assert
a defense of prior use. For purposes of this defense alone, “method” is defined
as “a method of doing or conducting business.” §273(a)(3). In other words, by
allowing this defense the statute itself acknowledges that there may be business
method patents. Section 273’s definition of “method,” to be sure, cannot change
the meaning of a prior-enacted statute. But what §273 does is clarify the
understanding that a business method is simply one kind of “method” that is, at
least in some circumstances, eligible for patenting under §101.
A
conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any circumstances would
render §273 meaningless. This would violate the canon against interpreting any
statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision superfluous
(See Corley v. United States, 2009). This principle, of course, applies to
interpreting any two provisions in the U. S. Code, even when Congress enacted
the provisions at different times (See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, (1939)). This established rule of statutory
interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial speculation as to the subjective
intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent provision. Finally,
while §273 appears to leave open the possibility of some business method
patents, it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed
inventions.
You noted that the Supreme Court mentioned the
possibility of overlap, in Mayo. Put together with the Bilski opinion, it is a
violation of the canon against applying provisions in only one section of
U.S.C.35 when provisions in other sections also apply; the 'overlap' referred to
in Mayo.
I wonder if,This established rule of statutory
interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial speculation as to the subjective
intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent
provision.
was aimed at Judge Rich. It was the 'machine or
transformation' test emanating from his circuit that they were railing against,
but I suspect they had Judge Rich's 'three doors' process in mind, as well. He
was, after all, on the legislative team for U.S.C. 35. --- Regards
Ian Al
Software Patents: It's the disclosed functions in the patent, stupid! [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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