Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, June 11 2013 @ 06:45 PM EDT |
It seems to me like they are trying to keep classified documents from being
picked up by a hacking attempt on less then secure systems...[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, June 11 2013 @ 06:54 PM EDT |
It sounds to me like they are warning their folks that there are some documents
that are freely available on the Internet that contain material they want to
them to believe is actually classified. That only makes sense to a post 9/11
mindset, but I suppose some of them may have been labelled classified after they
were published and released to the masses. That would be one way to trap
unsuspecting citizens and non-citizens alike.
I wonder if the notice contained a list of known 'classified' documents.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, June 11 2013 @ 07:02 PM EDT |
>> Classified information, whether or not already posted
on public websites, disclosed to the media, or otherwise
in the public domain remains classified <<
Even the Katzenjammer Kidz could do better than that.
There's an extra-strong version of KoolAid specially for DoD.
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Authored by: SpaceLifeForm on Tuesday, June 11 2013 @ 08:01 PM EDT |
If various people within the the NSA were to read
the leaked docs, they may realize how extensive
the scope of the mess is, and may decide to leak
even more info.
This is an attempt to plug the dike.
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You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: jesse on Tuesday, June 11 2013 @ 08:41 PM EDT |
DoD procedures require the system that contains classified information to be
wiped - and not by the general wipe functions. It frequently requires the disks
to be replaced due to the inability to actually wipe current disks (bad sectors
don't get wiped, cache features reduce the effectiveness of overwrites, as the
cache is specifically designed to reduce the number of writes).
Been through that - a single email message got sent to a server,
1. the system that sent it got wiped.
2. the disks of the recipient got wiped.
3. the disks of the mail server the messages were stored on got wiped.
4. the backups of the messages got wiped.
5. the server hosting the backups were directed to be wiped...
6. any system that MAY have retrieved the backups also were supposed to be
wiped...
And this was due to one accident, entirely contained internally. Management
requested a suspension of the procedures due to the fact that the backup server
had over 400TB of data, across several thousands of tapes, and about 60TB of
disks. And the server provided data for several supercomputers. They had to
explain the technical details of the isolation of backups from general data,
access controls limiting system access, and the problem that the backup server
optimized tape usage by storing multiple data backups on tapes (which caused
problems trying to wipe the tape due to other data on the tape).
It would have effectively shutdown an entire branch for over a month.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, June 12 2013 @ 03:44 AM EDT |
I translate that quote as saying:
"Don't access secure data on unsecure systems."
Seems like what I do:
No personal logins on computers I don't own.
No personal logins on internet connections I don't rent directly unless I'm
running the connection encrpyted.
No data I don't want people to know being stored on hardware that I don't own
and have in property that I own.
That's just good practice, isn't it? Who doesn't work like that?[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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